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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
W. S. HATCH CO., a Utah corporation,

Petitvoner,
-vs.PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF'
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, DONALD
HACKING, STEWART M. HANSON, its
Commissioners; THE DENVER AND
RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILROAD
CO., a Delaware corporation; THE
UNION P ACIFIG RAILROAD COMPANY, a Utah corporation; and GUY
PRICHARD, dba Guy Prichard Transfer,

Case No.
8182

Respondents

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF

In their brief the respondents, Public Service Commission and Guy Prichard, cite the case of Ashworth
Transfer Co. et al. v. Public Service Commvssion, et al.,
268 P. 2d 990, ______ Utah ------, as one which "cannot be distinguished in substance from the one here" and as a case
which "unanimously resolved that question (the right
of Prichard to transport acid) in Prichard's favor."
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We submit that the case is not in point, does not resolve any question in Prichard's favor, but does in fact
specifically indicate the evils which result from a construction such as that contended for by respondents.
In that case the court was considering whether "·explosives" were "supplies ... incidental to ... operation (of
facilities) ... for the ... production of natural gas and
petroleum." The court so held, being aided by the fact
that the term "explosives" was specifically rnentioned as
one of the products which the carrier in that case was authorized to haul. Furthermore, explosives are used in
the development and prod.uction of natural gas and petroleum. Acids are not.
The following quotations from the case are, we think,
significant and helpful in determining the type of commodities which Prichard is authorized to haul. The authority being construed therein is, for all practical purposes, identical to Prichard's.
"The transporters of heavy and bulky articles
are frequently referred to in the industry as heavy
haulers and riggers, terminology which in large
measure describes the service performed by them.
. . . The commodities transported by this group
of carriers are of such size or weight as to require
special devices for their loading and unloading
and the use of special equipment for their movement over the road."
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The court quoted the Interstate Commerce Commission as follows in pointing out some of the infirmities
connected with a grant of authority in the language under
consideration :
"On the other hand, a broad grant of authority under a generic heading often leads to abuse:s
through 'weird theories of interpretation and consrtuction' to justify hauling commodities not contemplated by the grant." (Emphasis added.)
The court further described the commodities covered
by the authority as those that "may vary from a heavy
piece of machinery to a huge girder."
We urge the court to consider the apparent difficulty
encountered by the Commission and by the respondent
Prichard in arriving at a theory which will support the
Commission's order and Prichard's contention that he has
authority to transport acid in bulk in tank truck vehicles.
No less than four such theories have been advancedsome of which have been rejected by the respondents
themselves. They are as follows:
1.

The Commission chose to justify its action on

the basis of a previously existing contract carrier
permit which was not put in evidence and about which
we know nothing. See pages 9 to 14 of petitioner's brief.
2. During the hearing counsel for respondent Prichard advanced the theory that he could haul acid because
it required "special equipment," (seeR. 106):
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"MR. FINLINSON: Well, our position is
that under our authority we can haul acid, in that
acid requires special equipment and under our
authority we can haul it."
3. Later in the hearing counsel chose to base his
contention on the theory that acid required a "special
service" in preparing it for shipment or setting it up after
delivery (seeR. 109, 110):
"MR. FINLINSON: Gentlemen, I call your
attention to paragraph 2 of his authority:
'Commodities in connection with the
transporting of which is rendered a special
service in preparing such commodities for
shipment or setting up after delivery or
otherwise rendering a needed service not a
part of the ordinary act of transporting and
not now regularly furnished by other regular
common carriers for the regular line rates.'
"Now, Gentlemen, I submit that that covers
the hauling of acid, ... "
These first three theories have been covered in petitioner's original brief to which we invite the court's
attention.
4. At page 5 of respondents' brief respondents rejected the theory adopted by the Commission in the
following language:
"Whatever pre-existing contract carrier permit Prichard had or did not have is here immaterial since his present authority includes the transportation of acid in the designated areas. We so
contend." (Emphasis added.)
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5. On page 3 of respondents' brief they adopt still
another and we suppose a final theory to sustain their
position, by stating:
"Sulphuric acid is a 'supply' ... used in, the
... operation, of facilities for the ... development,
and production of ... minerals,' (uranium) and
as such, is a commodity Prichard is authorized
to transport."
To sustain this theory the court must find that a uranium processing mill is a facility used for the "discovery,
development and production of natural gas and petroleum or minerals." The terms "discovery," "d'evelopment"
and (• produ.ction" have a very definite and well defined
meaning in the oil and gas and mining industries. A
miner or prospector discovers a mineral in place. He
then does what is commonly called "development work"
to determine the existence of the mineral or of the oil
and gas field. After the ground is sufficiently developed
to warrant the expenditure of additional ti1ne, effort and
money the oil, gas or mineral is produced, that is to say,
it is extracted from the earth. If the operation is successful we have what is commonly known as a "producing
well" or a "producing mine." Once the oil, gas or mineral
is separated from the earth the production thereof is at
an end. The subsequent step of refining, milling, smelting or processing is entirely separate and distinct from
the discovery, development and production. We submit
that Prichard's contention is one of the "weird constructions" referred to in the Ashworth case. If he is able
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to haul acid to uranium processing mills under his present authority he is likewise able to haul any "supply" to
any oil refinery or to any smelter. Furthermore, under
his contention the "supply" need not "be such as" those
specifically mentioned in his authority. Certainly acid
has no more relation to the heavy commodities mentioned
in Prichard's authority than would office supplies, office
furniture, oil, gasoline, -or any other of the hundreds of
different types of supplies used by smelting companies
and oil refineries.
Counsel has conceded that sulphuric acid i's not a
supply used in a facility for the discovery of minerals
so we have limited our authorities to those defining the
terms "development" and "production."
The eases clearly show that the terms "development"
and "production" apply only to the processes of locating
the oil, gas or mineral and extracting it from the ground.
In the case of Blewett v. Hoyt, 103 N.Y.S. 451, 457; 118
App. Div. 227, the court defined the term "develop" as
follows:
"To 'develop' is defined by Webster to be 'to
free from that which enfolds or envelopes; to lay
open by degrees or in detail, to disclose, to .produce or give forth,' and, by the Standard Dictionary 'to uncover or unfold; to bring to light by
degree, work out in detail.' Thus to develop a mining claim is to uncover or bring forth that which
it produces or can produce."
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In the Vtah case of Miller v. PeruviG!n Consolidated
Mining Company, 11 P. 2d 291, 294, 79 Utah 401, this
court stated:
"The incorporators use the terms 'working'
and 'developing' which ordinarily have application
to the mines .or claim·s for the purpose of getting
the ores." (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Harrwver Co. v. Hines, 11 S.W. 2d 621,
the court held that there was a plain distinction between
an obligation to develop land in order t.o determine number, location and value of oil-bearing sands, if any, and
an obligation to bring the oil and gas to the surface or to
preserve such minerals thereafter.
In the case of Charlton v. Kelly, 166 F. 433, 84 CCA
295, the court held that the term "development" as used
in an instruction regarding the necessity of a discovery
in a. lode mining claim, was the equivalent of "exploration."
In the case of Lacer u. Sumpter, 249 S.W. 1026;
198 Ky. 752, the court held that in the oil industry a
provision in a lease requiring the lessee to continue "development" of the property must be construed as a continuation of the work in hand in a manner that would
discover oil if it existed and promote its "production."
The following cases construe the term "production":
Tedrow v. Shaffer, 155 N.E. 510, 511; 23 Ohio App.
343.
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Under oil and gas lease for ten years and as much
longer as oil is "found" in paying quantities the word
"found" is synonymous with the word "produced" which
refers to oil when brought to the surface.
In Re S;Niclati,r Pratirti.e Co o' 53 P o 2d 221 ' 223 ·' 175
Okla. 289.
VI!,<

U

"

"

Oil may be said to be "produced" for gross production taxation purpose's when it is brought to surface and
confined in such a rnanner as to permit its measurement
as to quantity and its testing as to value.
So. Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 76 S.E. 961, 965; 71

W.Va. 438.
The terms "produced" and "produced in paying
quantities" and "found in paying quantitie's" as used
in an oil and gas lease are synonymous.
We submit that the terms discovery, development
and production cannot fairly be construed to mean refining, milling, smelting or processing. Witnes·s Riddle
clearly explained the processing which takes place at ·a
uranium mill. The uranium is extracted from the ore by
a carbonate or soda ash leaching process which consi'sts of
roasting or baking the ore at temperatures to 800°C. in
a solution in which sulphuric acid is used. (R. 212.)
Furthermore, the "supplies" to which re·spondent
refers must be read in light of the specific commodities
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mentioned in paragraph 1 of Prichard's authority and
cannot be of a type wholly different from those designated. \V e cannot completely disregard the rule of
ejusdem generis.
There is still another factor which points up the
fallacy in respondents' theory. If Prichard's authority
to haul acid is dependent upon his authority to haul sup-plies used in the operation of a facility for the discovery,
development and production of minerals, how then does
he justify the Commission's action in giving him authority to transport acid to the Utah Power & Light
steam electric generating plant in Castle Gate~ The
sulphuric acid is used at this generating plant as a water
softener and the plant itself has no other purpose than
to generate electricity. Does Prichard contend that this,
too, is the development or production of oil, gas or minerals J Furthermore, the Commission's order does not
restrict Prichard in any way as to what customers he can
serve; hence, it is apparent that the Commission does not
adopt Prichard's theory and Prichard (and we suppose
the Attorney General) have expressly denounced the
Commission's theory.
CONCLUSION
Prichard's authority covers the transportation of
heavy, bulky, solid commodities and cannot be interpreted
to include transportation of acid in bulk in tank truck
vehicles.
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We further contend that the Commission's finding
as to the area needing truck transportation is too restrictive in light of the evidence which clearly showed
many and varied sources of new and spent acid as well as
many and varied uses therefor. Since no other truck
carrier is authorized to transport acid the Commission
abused its discretion in not granting the application in
its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
MARR, WILKINS & CANNON
MARK K. BOYLE

Attorneys for Petitioner
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